Take or Pay Contracts and Market Segmentation by Scarpa, Carlo & Polo, Michele
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Take or Pay Contracts and Market
Segmentation
Carlo Scarpa and Michele Polo
IEFE (Centre For Research on Energy and Environmental
Economics and Policy) - Bocconi University
2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5861/
MPRA Paper No. 5861, posted 22. November 2007 06:06 UTC
 
  
 
 Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi 
 IEFE 
  Istituto di Economia e Politica dell’Energia e dell’Ambiente 
 
 
 
             ISSN 1973-0381 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
www.iefe.unibocconi.it 
Take or Pay Contracts and Market Segmentation 
 
 
 
 
Michele Polo,Carlo Scarpa 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper N.5 
 
 
July 2007 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Take or Pay Contracts and Market Segmentation 
 
 
Michele Polo, Bocconi University and IGIER* 
Carlo Scarpa, University of Brescia 
 
 
July 11, 2007 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines competition in the liberalized natural gas market. Each .firm has zero marginal 
cost core capacity, due to long term contracts with take or pay obligations, and additional capacity 
at higher marginal costs. The market is decentralized and the firms decide which customers to 
serve, competing then in prices. In equilibrium each .firm approaches a different segment of the 
market and sets the monopoly price, i.e. market segmentation. Antitrust ceilings do not prevent such 
an outcome while the separation of wholesale and retail activities and the creation of a wholesale 
market induces generalized competition and low margins in the retail segment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords Entry, Segmentation, Decentralized market 
JEL classification: L11, L13, L95 
 
*Corresponding author: IEP – Università Bocconi, Via Gobbi, 5, 20136 Milano, Italy. Tel.: +39 02 58363307-1; fax 
+39 02 58365314, michele.polo@unibocconi.it 
 
 
 
Take or Pay Contracts and Market
Segmentation 
Michele Polo
Bocconi University and IGIER
Carlo Scarpa
University of Brescia
June 2007
Abstract
This paper examines competition in the liberalized natural gas market.
Each rm has zero marginal cost core capacity, due to long term contracts
with take or pay obligations, and additional capacity at higher marginal
costs. The market is decentralized and the rms decide which customers
to serve, competing then in prices. In equilibrium each rm approaches a
di¤erent segment of the market and sets the monopoly price, i.e. market
segmentation. Antitrust ceilings do not prevent such an outcome while
the separation of wholesale and retail activities and the creation of a
wholesale market induces generalized competition and low margins in the
retail segment.
Keywords: Entry, Segmentation, Decentralized market
JEL Classication numbers: L11, L13, L95
1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze if competition may emerge in the natural gas markets
as shaped by the liberalization process implemented in Europe since the second
part of the Nineties. In this period the European Commission has promoted
through several Directives the liberalization of the main public utility markets,
such as telecommunications, electricity and natural gas; the framework adopted
is by and large common to these industries, and rests on the open access to
the network infrastructures, the unbundling of monopolistic from competitive
activities and the opening of demand.
The natural gas Directive 98/30 has specied the lines of reform that the
Member Countries then followed in the national liberalization plans. Contrary
to the case of electricity markets, no wholesale pool market is recommended
Corresponding author: Michele Polo, Department of Economics, Bocconi University,
Via Sarfatti 25, 20136 Milan, Italy, michele.polo@uni-bocconi.it. Tel. +390258363307, fax
+390258365314. We want to thank Paolo Battigalli, Joe Harrington, Alberto Iozzi, Massimo
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Idei-Toulouse and the Italian Energy Regulator. Usual disclaimers apply.
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for the natural gas. The general principle of Third Party Access (TPA) has
been conrmed, with one relevant exception, namely when giving access to the
network would create technical or nancial problems to the incumbent because
of its take-or-pay (TOP) obligations.
A take-or-pay obligation entails an unconditional xed payment, which en-
ables the purchaser to get up to a certain threshold quantity of gas. This
payment is due whether or not the company actually decides to get (and resell)
it, and further payments are due if the company wants to receive additional
quantities. The very nature of this kind of contracts, therefore, is to substite
variable payments conditional on actual deliveries with a xed unconditional
payment up to a certain threshold level of delivery.1
We argue that the existence of take-or-pay obligations not only creates prob-
lems in the application of the TPA, but introduces a natural strategic incentive
for rms to avoid competition for nal customers. Therefore, entry may entail
no actual competition (and no benet for the consumers) as the rms will choose
to concentrate on di¤erent customers, thus segmenting demand.
We derive this result on the basis of three main assumptions which refer to
key features of the European gas industry and by the main lines of reform of the
European Directives. First, wholesalers purchase gas under long term import
contracts, the bulk of gas supply in most European countries, that impose take-
or-pay obligations to the buyer. Consequently, each wholesaler has negligible
marginal costs up to its obligations, although it has additional capacity at higher
marginal cost, coming for instance from extentions of the long term contracts.
Second, there is no separation of wholesale and retail activities nor a wholesale
market, and the retail market is decentralized: the wholesalers can directly
operate in the retail market, selecting which customers to approach. Third, once
chosen their potential customers rms compete in prices, with some horizontal
di¤erentiation in their service. Horizontal di¤erentiation is an easy way to justify
the idea that retail markets can be opened to competition and they are not
natural monopolies, even if rms compete in prices and supply a homogenous
product as the natural gas. A limited product di¤erentiation, indeed, allows
some small but positive margins to cover possible entry costs and sustain a
fragmented market.
In this setting we study the (marketing and price) equilibria when a new
comer enters in the market competing with the incumbent. In a decentralized
market each rm decides which customers to serve. When two rms with TOP
obligations target the same customers, the two rms have the same (zero) mar-
ginal costs, and equilibrium margins are low due to price competition. When
instead only one of the two rms has TOP obligations, the high marginal cost
competitor is unable to obtain positive prots in a price equilibrium. This fea-
ture of price competition with TOP obligations drives the commercial strategies
of the rms: entering the same market is never convenient because it gives low
prots and leaves residual obligations to the two rms (fostering competing en-
1Take-or-pay obligations can add further conditions, as the possibility to shift across di¤er-
ent years part of the commitments. However, the essential feature of these clauses is captured
by the simple version we consider in the model.
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tries in other submarkets). Leaving a fraction of the customers to the rival,
instead, allows it to exhaust its TOP obligations and makes it a high cost (po-
tential) rival with no incentive to compete on the residual demand. In a word,
leaving the rival to act as a monopolist on a fraction of the market guarantees a
rm to be a monopolist on the residual demand. It should be stressed that the
high xed TOP payments play no role in our result, that would still hold even
with negligible or no xed costs. The segmentation result, instead, is driven
entirely by the existence of low cost capacity due to TOP obligations.
Our results may have some interest in the policy debate on gas liberalization.
The discussion so far has focussed on the development and access to interna-
tional and national transport infrastructures and on the unbundling of activities
of incumbent rms.2 The recent Energy sector inquiry of the European Com-
mission (2006) stresses that problems of access are still the main concern of
policy makers. Although we share this claim, we argue that even if the access
problems were solved there would still be a serious issue of (wholesale and retail)
market design that so far has received little attention. We show that even gas
release programmes aimed at reducing the incumbents market shares can be
unable to provide actual benets to the customers.
A more competitive outcome might instead be obtained if wholesale and
retail activities are separated and a centralized wholesale market is created,
where the wholesalers (burdened by TOP obligations) sell and the retailers buy
gas. In this case, the retailers when designing their marketing strategies, have
the same at marginal cost equal to the wholesale price for any amount of gas
they want to supply, and therefore they will obtain, contrary to the benchmark
case, small but positive margins in any market they enter. Generalized entry
becomes the dominant stategy, bringing in intense price competition and low
margins in the retail market.
The existing literature on take or pay contracts (see Creti and Villeneuve,
2004, for a broad survey) focusses almost entirely on the reasons which justify
their existence. For instance, Crocker and Masten (1985) argue that a simple
contract of this kind provides appropriate incentives to limit opportunistic be-
haviour, while Hubbard and Weiner (1986) emphasize the risk sharing properties
of such a contract. However, the consequences of these contracts on competition
remain out of the scope of these analyses.
A second stream of literature which is relevant to our analysis is the one on
market competition with capacity constraints or decreasing returns. Although
our motivation is primarely on liberalization of the gas industry, our segmen-
tation result may be of independent interest in the analysis of price equilibria
with capacity constraints. While price competition with constant marginal costs
leads to the Bertrand outcome, since the seminal work by Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983) we know that capacity constraints may modify the incentives to cut-
throat price competition. When a rm faces constant marginal costs up to a
2For an extensive discussion of the liberalization process in the energy markets along these
lines see Polo and Scarpa (2003).
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certaint absolute capacity constraint, the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
is equivalent to the corresponding Cournot equilibrium if rms follow an e¢ cient
rationinig rule, while it is intermediate between Cournot and Bertrand if pro-
portinal rationing is applied (Davidson and Deneckere (1986).Vives (1986) shows
that if marginal costs are at up to capacity and then they are increasing, their
steepness determines how the equilibrium ranges from Bertrand to Cournot.
The literature on supply function equilibria (Klemperer and Meyer (1989)) has
generalized this intuition showing that if rms can choose and commit to any
supply function, all the individually rational outcomes can be implemented in
equilibrium. Our paper adopts the same technology as Maggi (1996)3 , that
introduces discontinuous marginal costs as those that emerge with TOP obliga-
tions. Maggi shows that the amplitude of the stepwise increase in the marginal
cost determines equilibrium outcomes that range from Bertrand (no jump) to
Cournot.
Our paper shares many features of the analysis of Bertrand-Edgeworth com-
petition with dynamic pricing4 : Dubey (1992) shows that absolute capacity
constraints and dynamic pricing over a sequence of consumers avoids price cy-
cles (or mixed strategy equilibvria) and leads to almost monopoly prices. We
show in out paper that similar results can be obtained with no absolute capacity
constraint and with simultanous pricing, provided that entry and pricing in the
submarkets are taken sequentially.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the main as-
sumptions of the model; section 3 analyzes the sequential entry case; section 4
considers the endogenous choice of TOP obligations by the entrant. Antitrust
ceilings and centralized vs. decentralized markets are discussed in section 5 and
6. Concluding remarks follow, while an Appendix contains the proofs of the
results.
2 The model
Two rms, the incumbent (I) and the entrant (E), are active in the retail
market for natural gas provision. The rms purchase the natural gas from
the extractors and resell it to the nal customers transporting it through the
pipeline network. Although third party access is far from established in the
natural gas industry in many European countries, in this paper we want to
study the features of entry and competition in the retail market, absent any
entry barriers to the transport infrastructures that might distort the competitive
process. Consequently, we assume that Third Party Access is fully implemented,
implying that no bottleneck or abusive conduct prevents the access of the entrant
to the transportation network at non discriminatory terms.
3The same technology can be found in Dixit (1980): in this paper the incumbent has
already sunk a given capacity and therefore has marginal costs deriving from variable inputs
up to this capacity and a higher marginal cost, that includes the cost of installing additional
capacity, for higher output.
4See also Ghemawat and McGahan (1998) on order backlogs for similar arguments.
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Our model of the retail market is based on three main features.
1. The wholesale activity (buying gas from extractors) and the retail activity
(selling gas to the nal customers) are not separated and are managed by
the same rms (retailers). The main source of supply for the retailers are
long term contracts with the extractors with take-or-pay obligations on a
certain amount of gas; hence, the retailers have zero marginal cost up to
the output that fullls these obligations. They can obtain additional gas
from other sources, as spot contracts or extensions of the main contract,
at a (higher) marginal cost that reects the marginal purchase price.
2. The liberalized retail gas market is decentralized (single transactions may
take place with di¤erent customers at di¤erent times and at di¤erent
prices) and each rm has to decide which customers/submarkets it wants
to approach, an irreversible decision in the short run. Submarkets can
be identied by location (geographical submarkets) or by the type of cus-
tomers (residential, business, specic industries, etc.) that require dedi-
cated (sunk) sales resources.
3. Once chosen which customers to approach (their marketing strategy) the
rms compete in prices, possibly with a slight di¤erentiation in the com-
mercial service provided.
We now move on describing in details the costs, demand and timing of the
game.
Costs
The retailerss costs refer to the purchase, transport and sales of gas. Since
we assume that transport services are o¤ered at non discriminatory terms, the
network access costs are the same for E and I and, w.l.o.g., equal to zero.
Variable sales costs are assumed to be zero as well. Purchase costs depend on
the nature of the upstream contractual arrangements. The bulk of retailers
costs refer therefore to the purchase of gas from the extractors. Each retailer
i = I; E has a portfolio of long term contracts with the extractors, where the
unit cost of gas wi and a TOP obligation qi per unit of time are specied, such
that the retailer has to pay to the extractor an amount wiqi no matter if the gas
is taken or not. Retailers can obtain additional supply from secondary sources,
as extensions of the main contract or spot contracts with other providers. In our
setting what distinguishes the primary from the secondary source is the nature
of the marginal purchase price: it is zero up to the TOP obligations qi while it
is positive and (w.l.o.g.) equal to wi for additional supply5 . Notice that in our
model the rms have no capacity constraints but a discontinuous marginal cost
5Long term contracts usually include additional clauses, as a total annual capacity that
can be 25-30% larger than TOP obligations, and rules to anticipate or postpone the fulllment
of TOP obligations across years. All these elements do not modify the key element in our
analysis, a discontinuous marginal purchase price once TOP obligations are exhausted. Hence,
we model the costs according to this essential feature.
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curve, that jumps from 0 to wi once the TOP obligations are exhausted. For
simplicity, we assume wE = wI = w.
The cost function of rm i is therefore:
Ci(qi; qi) =

wqi for 0  qi  qi
w(qi   qi) + wqi for qi  qi (1)
Demand
Individual consumers d = 1; ::; D have completely inelastic unit demand;
total demand is therefore D. They view the gas supplied in the market as per-
fectly homogeneous; however, consumers attach to each rm other (commercial
or locational) characteristics that make the services slightly di¤erentiated. We
adopt a Hotelling-type specication. The customers are uniformly distributed
with respect to their preferred variety of the service according to a parameter
v 2 [0; 1]. The utility of a consumer with preferred variety v purchasing one
unit of gas at price pi from rm i o¤ering a service with characteristic xi 2 [0; 1]
is u   pi    (v   xi)2, where   0 is a parameter describing the importance
of the commercial services (product di¤erentiation) for the client. Our model,
therefore, includes perfect substitutability ( = 0) as a special case.
There are three key parameters in the model, u, w and  , whose values
inuence the equilibrium outcomes. Qualitatively, we claim that gas is an im-
portant input in many activities (u is high), it is costly (w is large as well) and
it is a commodity, with limited oportunities to di¤erentiate the o¤ers ( is very
low). We translate these qualitative claims into the following assumptions:
u  w + 33
16
 (2)
w >
 
2
 0 (3)
Assumption (2) is su¢ cient to ensure that a monopolist prefers to cover the
entire market at the highest possible price rather than further rise it and ration
the market and that its equilibrium prots are non negative.6 Assumption (3)
ensures that internal solutions give non negative prices in any subgame where
the two rms compete. See Proposition 1s proof for details.
Each rm i = I; E is characterized by a specic variety xi of the service,
due to its location and/or commercial practices. We assume that xI = 1=4
and xE = 3=4, i.e. the two rms have some (exogenous) di¤erence in the
service provided7 . The rms do not observe the individual customers tastes
(her preferred service variety v) but know only the (uniform) distribution of
6This assumption ensures also that when the incumbent has an absolute capacity constraint
(antitrust ceilings in section 5), it is not convenient for the two rms to jointly exploit the
second market by setting monopoly prices and sharing the consumers - see Lemma 3s proof.
7Since we already analyze an asymmetric model, with the incumbent endowed with larger
obligations and with and advantage in approaching the customers, we do not endogenize the
choice of variety, where the incumbent might obtain additional advantages by locating its
variety more centrally.
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the customers according to their tastes. We can easily derive the expected
demand of the two rms from a subset of Dt  D consumers (market t). Let
us dene bv as the consumer indi¤erent between the o¤ers of I and E; vI as the
consumer indi¤erent between the o¤er of the incumbent and buying nothing,
and vE as the consumer indi¤erent between buying from E or nothing. It is
easy to check that:
bv = 1
2
+
pE   pI
 
vI =

u   pI
 
 1
2
+
1
4
vE =

u   pE
 
 1
2
+
3
4
Then, the demand for rm I in market t is
DIt = Dt 

max

0;min
bv; vI ; 1		 max1
2
  vI ; 0

(4)
and the demand for E corresponds to
DEt = Dt 

min

1; vE
	 min1;max0; bv; 3
2
  vE

(5)
The two expressions give the demand for the active rm(s) if one or both
rms entered market t (and o¤er relevant prices to the customers): for instance,
when both rms are active and the market is covered we obtain the usual demand
system of the Hotelling model,
DIt = Dt

1
2
+
pEt   pIt
 

and
DEt = Dt

1
2
+
pIt   pEt
 

;
when only the incumbent entered in market t and the market is not completely
covered, due to the very high price set, the demand is DtI = D
tvI , etc.
TOP obligations and capacities
The portfolios of long term contracts of the two rms reect their di¤erent
positions: before the liberalization, the incumbent was the only supplier of
the market, while the entrant is trying to capture some market share. The
obligations of the incumbent, given its previous position, are very large but
do not exceed market demand, i.e qI  D. In the equilibrium analysis well
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concentrate on the case qI < D in which the incumbents obligations do not
cover the entire demand;8 once understood the equilibrium in this case, the
extension to the case qI = D will be straightforward. Regarding the entrants
long term contracts, we initially assume that its obligations are equal to the
residual demand, i.e
qE = D   qI (6)
Once the benchmark model is analyzed, well endogenize the entrants choice
of obligations qE , showing that indeed the entrant selects obligations equal to
the residual market D   qI .
To sum up, the long term contracts of the two rms enable them to supply the
market at zero marginal cost, since total obligations are equal to total demand.
Moreover, the market is very liquid, as each rm can obtain additional capacity
(at the same unit cost w) from the extractors.
Competition and timing
The market is decentralized, so that rms have to decide which clients to deal
with, and propose a price to their potential customers. A given customer may
thus face no o¤er, one o¤er (by a rm that would then be a monopolist for that
customer), or two o¤ers from the two competing rms. Price competition arises
in a particular submarket if both rms approach the same group of customers.
Once received the o¤er(s) - if any - the customer decides whether to sign a
contract or not. Once a contract is signed, the selected provider supplies all the
gas demanded by the customer, since the technology does not imply absolute
capacity constraints but simply a discontinuous marginal cost. We assume that
the decision to serve a submarket is irreversible in the short run, as it requires to
sink some resources (e.g. local distribution networks, local o¢ ces and dedicated
personnel). Moreover, the incumbent is always able to move rst in approaching
the customers, due to his pre-existing relationships with the clients, followed by
the entrant.
Customers are visited by the rms sequentially,9 and, for each customer,
once the marketing choices are taken, the active rms simultaneously propose
their prices. When we analyze price competition for the single customer, the
8Long term contracts usually admit additional capacity beyond TOP obligations. Hence, to
maintain some exibility, it is realistic to assume that the incumbent in the pre-liberalization
scenario did not accept obligations equal to market demand.
9 In the working paper version of the paper, available on www.igier.uni-bocconi.it, we an-
alyze also a (simultaneous entry) two stage game, in which I and E decides simultaneously
which submarkets to enter, and then, observed the entry decisions, they simultaneously set a
price in each submarket.. We show that equilibria with segmentation exist also in this case
and Pareto dominate other equilibria in which each rm enters every market. We present
here the sequential entry case since it allows to easily solve the coordination problems in the
pattern of submarket entries that otherwise would characterize the equilibria. On dynamic
price competition with capacity constraints see Dubey (1992) and Ghemawat P and McGahan
A. (1998).
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crucial element is the amount of residual TOP obligations of the rms, that
enable them to serve the customer at zero marginal cost. Then, from the point
of view of equilibrium analysis, since the incumbent moves rst, all the con-
tracting stages where the incumbent has residual TOP obligations greater (or
equal) than the submarket demand are similar: if I decides to enter, E antici-
pates that by entering in its turn, total TOP obligations will exceed submarket
demand. Hence, analyzing all these contracting stages sequentially, with I and
then E deciding to enter or not, is equivalent to grouping them together, as-
suming that there are only two relevant submarkets, the rst one as large as
the incumbents obligations, D1 = qI , and the second one covering the residual
demand, D2 = D   D1 = qE . As this compact formulation lends itself to a
shorter (but equivalent) equilibrium analysis, well adopt it: we assume that
the two rms decide sequentially at rst whether or not to enter market 1 and
then market 2, as dened above. We thus dene a variable eit = f0; 1g, i = I; E,
t = 1; 2, which refers to rm is decision to enter (e = 1) or not (e = 0) in a
particular submarket t.
From our discussion, the timing when qI < D is as follows:
 at t = 1 the incumbent decides whether to enter (eI1 = 1) or not (eI1 = 0)
in D1; then, having observed whether or not I participates, the entrant
chooses to enter (eE1 = 1) or not (e
E
1 = 0) in market D1. Then the
participating rm(s) (if any) set a price simultaneously.
 having observed the outcome of stage t = 1, at t = 2 the incumbent decides
whether to enter (eI2 = 1) or not (e
I
2 = 0) in D2; then, having observed
whether or not I participates, the entrant chooses to enter (eE2 = 1) or
not (eE2 = 0) in market D2. Then the participating rm(s) (if any) set a
price simultaneously.
Before moving to the equilibrium analysis, it appears convenient to anticipate
the main result, and then to show (backwards) how this can be proven. The
equilibrium of the game can be described as follows:
Result. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the incumbent enters
in the rst market, while the entrant enters in the second market. Both rms
charge to their customer(s) the monopoly price.
In order to understand how this result can be obtained, let us start from the
last stage of the game
3 The sequential entry game
In this section we analyze the subgame perfect equilibria in the sequential entry
game, where competition in the second market takes place once the outcome in
the rst one is determined. Although the two markets are separate, a strategic
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link between them remains, because the residual TOP obligations in the second
market depend on the outcome of the game in the rst stage. As we solve the
model backwards, we must rst consider the price equilibria and entry decisions
in the second market as a function of the number of rms applying for the
second group of customers and of their residual TOP obligations.
.
3.1 Pricing and entry in the second market
The entry and price subgames in the second stage depend on the entry and price
decisions in the rst market, which, in turn, determine the amount of residual
obligations: we can therefore parametrize the second stage subgames to (qI2; q
E
2 ),
where qi2  qi is the residual TOP obligation of rm i in the second market.
The prot function of rm i in the second market, if it enters, is:
i2 = p
i
2D
i
2(p
i
2; p
j
2)  Ci(Di2(:); qi2)
where we set qi = Di2(p
i
2; p
j
2) since each rms always supplies the gas demanded
by its customers.
We start by identifying precisely the combinations of residual obligations
(qI2; q
E
2 ) that can occur in the second market for any possible entry and pricing
decision of the two rms in the rst market. This allows us to restrict our
analysis of the equilibrium in the second market to the relevant cases.
Lemma 1: In the second market the residual obligations of the two rms
fall in one of the three following cases:
1) qI2 + q
E
2 = D2 with q
i
2 2 [0; D2], i = I; E
2) qI2 + q
E
2 > D2 with 0  qi2  D2=2 < qj2, i; j = I; E; i 6= j
3) qI2 + q
E
2 > D2 with q
i
2 > D2=2, , i = I; E
Proof. See Appendix.
We proceed now by identifying the best reply function when both rms enter
in the second market and compete in prices. First of all, notice that the prot
functions are continuous and concave, but kinked at qi2, due to the jump in the
marginal costs from 0 to w once the TOP obligations are exhausted. We start
by deriving rm is best reply to pj . Let bpi2(pj2; c) be the price that maximizes
prots for given pj2 when the marginal cost is c = f0; wg:
@i2(p
i
2; p
j
2; c)
@pi
=
1
2
+
pj2 + c
 
  2p
i
2
 
= 0
Let us further dene pi2(p
j
2; q
i
2) as the solution to:
Di2 = D2
"
1
2
+
pj2   pi2
 
#
= qi2
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i.e. the price pi2 that, for given p
j
2, makes rm is demand equal to its residual
obligations. Solving explicitly we obtain:
bpi2(pj2; c) = pj2 + c2 +  4
pi2(p
j
2; q
i
2) = p
j
2  
 
2D2
(2qi2  D2)
The following Lemma characterizes the best reply for rm i.
Lemma 2 : Let BRi2(p
j
2) be the best reply to p
j
2. Then
BRi2(p
j
2) =
8>>><>>>:
bpi2(pj2; 0) for pj2 2 h0;maxn0;  2D2 (4qi2  D2)oi
pi2(p
j
2; q
i
2) for p
j
2 2
h
max
n
0;  2D2 (4q
i
2  D2)
o
; w +  2D2 (4q
i
2  D2)
i
bpi2(pj2; w) for pj2 2 hw +  2D2 (4qi2  D2); ui
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 1 below shows the best reply BRi2(p
j
2) that is piecewise linear and
continuous, with the lower segment AB (if any) corresponding to bpi2(pj2; 0), the
intermediate segment BC given by pi2(p
j
2; q
i
2) and the upper segment CD equal
to bpi2(pj2; w). Notice that when the residual obligation qi2 increases, pi2(pj2; qi2) de-
creases, shifting up the intermediate segment BC of the best reply characterized
by a 45 slope.
Figure 1 about here
Having identied the relevant subgames, corresponding to combinations of
the residual obligations described in Lemma 1, and the best reply function when
both rms enter in the second market (Lemma 2), we can now proceed analyzing
the price equilibria that occur in the di¤erent subgames according to the entry
decisions of the two rms in the second market.
Proposition 1: The equilibrium prices in the second stage of the game are
as follows:
1) If both rms enter the second market and if qI2 + q
E
2 = D2 with q
i
2 2
[0; D2], i = I; E (case 1), the (Pareto e¢ cient) equilibrium prices are
pi2 = w +  
qi2
D2
(7)
pj2 = w +  
4qi2  D2
2D2
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where qi2  D2=2  qj2, i.e. i is the smaller and j the larger rm. Each rm
sells all its residual TOP obligation.
2) If both rms enter the second market and if qI2+ q
E
2 > D2 with 0  qi2 
D2=2 < q
j
2, i; j = I; E; i 6= j (case 2), the equilibrium prices are
pi2 =  
3D2   4qi2
2D2
(8)
pj2 =  
D2   qi2
D2
Only the smaller rm i sells all its residual TOP obligation.
3) If both rms enter the second market and if qI2+q
E
2 > D2 with q
i
2 > D2=2,
i = I; E (case 3), the equilibrium prices are
pi2 =
 
2
(9)
pj2 =
 
2
and each rm serves half of the market.
4) If only rm i enters, it sets price pi2 = u
   916 and serves the entire
market D2 for any residual obligation it has.
Proof. See Appendix.
Case (1) refers to a situation where capacity equals demand, and equilibrium
prices cannot be larger than w +  =2. If residual TOP capacity is larger than
demand, we have two additional cases, labelled (2) and (3). In both of them,
competition leads to prices lower than in case (1), but above the zero marginal
cost due to product di¤erentiation (the demand parameter  ). Prices would fall
to w in case (1) and to 0 in case (2) and (3), in line with the Bertrand result,
when we converge to the homogeneous products case ( ! 0). Our equilibrium
prices imply an allocation of demand between i and j in all cases (including
the limiting case of homogeneous products) such that in case (1) both rms
sell their residual obligations, in case (2) only the small rm sells its residual
obligations and in case (3) the two rms equally share the market. Case (4) of
Proposition 1 identies monopoly prices for any level of the residual obligations.
Figure 2 shows the three cases 1), 2) and 3) in which both rms are active in
market 2 and the di¤erent points of intersection of the two best reply functions.
Figure 2 about here
We can now move to the entry decisions of the two rms in the subgames of
the second market, having characterized the equilibrium prices in any subgame.
In the entry decision we assume that if a rm by entering expects zero prots
(zero sales in our setting), that rm will remain out (no frivolous entry)10 .
10An analogous result would be obtained if we assumed that there are (however small) entry
costs.
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The following Proposition identies the entry equilibrium in all possible
cases.
Proposition 2: In the second market, a rm enters if and only if its residual
TOP obligations are positive.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind the equilibrium entry pattern is straightforward. At
the second stage, the price equilibria give positive sales and prots as long
as a rm has positive residual obligations; if a rm with residual obligations
competes with one that already exhausted them (but still decides to enter), at
the equilibrium prices the latter sells nothing. Hence, there is an incentive to
enter only if a rm has still obligations to be covered. Notice that this entry
pattern is entirely driven by the properties of price equilibria and the associated
sales for given residual obligations.
3.2 Equilibrium
Once obtained the entry and price equilibria in the second market in the four
subgames, we can turn our attention to the analysis of the entry and price
subgames in the rst market, when the two rms have still all their obligations
qI and qE . The rms choose their entry and pricing strategies in the rst
market taking into account the impact through the residual obligations on the
equilibrium in the subgames of the second market.
We start our analysis of the rst market by considering the price games. In
general, pricing in the rst market determines the amount of residual obligations
retained by the rms, and therefore the equilibrium prots that can be obtained
in the second market. This link makes the analysis of pricing decisions more
complex than in the second stage.
If only one rm enters in the rst market, we have to check whether the
optimal price entails covering the entire market (as shown for the second stage
in Proposition 1) or it prescribes to ration the rst market (through a price
higher than pm) retaining some residual obligations for the second market that
will induce further entry in the second market.
When both rms enter, if a rm sets its price in the rst market in such
a way to make the rival selling all its obligations, it gains monopoly prots in
the second market. But since this incentive applies to both rms if they enter
the rst market, this strategy is mutually inconsistent, leading to non existence
of price equilibria in pure strategies. The following proposition analyses the
di¤erent cases.
Proposition 3: The following price equilibria occur in the rst market:
a) If only rm i enters in the rst market, it sets the price pm = u   916 
and supplies the entire market D1.
b) If both rms enter in the rst market:
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1. there is no price equilibrium in pure strategies,
2. an equilibrium in mixed strategies I1 ; 
E
1 exists.
3. in the mixed strategy equilibrium both rms obtain positive expected prof-
its and the expected total prots of the entrant in the two markets are
EE(I1 ; 
E
1 ) < (u
   916 )D2.
Proof. See Appendix.
Some comments are in order.
Part (a) of Proposition 3 shows that the strategic link between the two
markets is insu¢ cient to distort the rst market pricing decisions when only
one rm enters. In this case the active rm faces two alternatives: extract
the monopoly rents from the consumers in the rst market, or retain some
residual obligations for the second market by overpricing above the monopoly
price, leaving some market 1 customers unserved. In this latter case, however,
the rm cannot extend its monopoly to the second market (where the rival
will enter being still endowed with positive TOP obligations) and it will obtain
competitive, rather than monopoly, returns on its residual obligations. Hence,
shifting some obligations to the second (competitive) market is not convenient,
and the rm sets the monopoly price and covers the entire market D1 without
entering market.2.
As for the price game when both rms enter in the rst market, when we
evaluate total equilibrium prots as a function of pi1 (given p
j
1) we nd the
following. When rm is o¤er is much cheaper than rm js, the former sells all
its obligations in the rst market and does not enter the second one, as shown
in Proposition 2. When the prices of the two rms are closer both use only
part of their TOP obligations in market 1, and therefore both rms enter the
second market. Finally, when rm is o¤er is much more expensive than rm
js, this latter exhausts its obligations in market 1, and only rm i enters as a
monopolist in market 2. Inducing the rival to sell all its obligations in the rst
market becomes the dominant strategy for both rms, since it secures monopoly
rents in the second market; and this is why we do not have a price equilibrium
in pure strategies in the rst market.
The crucial feature of the mixed strategy equilibrium (that arises when both
rms enter in market 1, so that both rms enter market 2 as well) is that the
total expected prots E can earn in both markets are below the monopoly prots
that it can earn with certainty in market 2 by staying out of market 1.
We have completed our analysis of the price games in the rst market, ob-
taining all the ingredients to address the entry decisions in the rst stage. The
following Proposition - in line with the claim expressed at the beginning of the
section - establishes our main segmentation result.
Proposition 4: When qI < D, in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium,
the incumbent enters in the rst market, while the entrant enters in the second
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market. Both rms charge to their customer(s) the monopoly price pm = u  
9
16 .
Proof. See Appendix.
Once analyzed the case where the incumbents obligations do not cover the
entire demand, we can easily consider the complementary case in which qI = D.
The following Corollary establishes the result.
Corollary 1: When qI = D, in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the
incumbent enters in the market and charges the monopoly price pm = u  916 ,
while the (potential) entrant does not enter.
When the incumbent is endowed with obligations equal to total demand
while the potential entrant has none, the results established in Proposition 1,
case 1 can be used to describe the equilibrium prices if the entrant enters in
the market after the incumbent. Since the entrants equilibrium sales are zero,
E will prefer to stay out of the market, that is completely monopolized by the
incumbent.
3.3 Comments to the result
The result obtained shows that when entry is allowed, the incumbent serves a
fraction of the market equal to its TOP obligations and leaves the rest (if any)
to the entrant. Liberalization, in this setting, allows the entry of new rms but
does not bring in competition, inducing segmentation and monopoly pricing.
When a rm has TOP clauses, in fact, its cost structure is characterized by
zero marginal costs up to the obligations and higher marginal cost for larger
quantities. If both rms enter in the rst market, we have two consequences:
the low marginal cost capacity is used in a competitive price game obtaining
low returns; moreover, both rms remain with positive residual obligations, that
induce them to enter in the second market as well, again with competitive low
returns. On the other hand, leaving a fraction of the market to the rival comes
out to be a mutually convenient strategy. The other rm, in fact, once exhausted
its TOP obligations serving the customers in a monopoly position, becomes a
high (marginal) cost competitor with no incentives to enter the residual fraction
of the market, since even entering it will not obtain any sales in the price
equilibrium. By leaving the rival in a monopoly position on a part of the market
a rm acquires a monopoly position on the residual customers.11
11Similar results can be found in Dubey (1992) on dynamic pricing with (absolute) capacity
constraints. Dubeys paper modies the standard Edgeworth-Bertrand setting assuming that
consumers enter in the market sequentially and purchase during the period; the rms, endowed
with a xed capacity, compete in prices in each period to attract the current consumer. In
this setting, pricing in di¤erent periods is the key ingredient that allows rms to avoid cut-
throath competition or Edgeworth-cycling, exhausting their capacity sequentially and serving
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The key ingredients of this result are decentralized trades and a core low
cost capacity, due to TOP obligations, two central features of the natural gas
industry. Decentralized trades implies that the rms have to decide which cus-
tomers they want to serve by committing to a certain marketing strategy, that
in our model corresponds to the initial decision to enter or not a given submar-
ket. The gas provision contracts signed with the producers create the incentives
to selective entry in the retail market. First, long term contracts are a nat-
ural commitment device, since they cannot be renegotiated or modied at will.
Secondly, although the market is apparently very liquid, since overall capacity
is unbounded, what matters to determine the basic market interaction is the
amount of low marginal cost capacity, i.e of TOP obligations.
Finally, it should be stressed that our segmentation result is not just an
example of the well known result that with high xed costs (the xed payments
entailed by TOP obligations) a market with intense price competition becomes
a monopoly in a free entry equilibrium. Suppose, in fact, that the rms have
large xed costs and constant marginal cost, with positive but limited margins
over marginal costs in a price equilibrium. In a free entry equilibrium where
the incumbent and the entrat decide sequentially to enter or not, we would
observe the incumbent monopolizing the entire market: it would enter in each
submarket and induce the entrant to stay out to avoid losses over the xed costs.
This traditional story would not deliver the alternating monoply result that we
obtain, such that an incumbent with a rst mover advantage in entering any
submarket will leave a fraction of the market to the entrant, once exhausted
its obligations. What drives our result, indeed, is the low cost capacity of the
competitors, that eliminates the incentive to enter once exhausted and that
creates reciprocity in the entry/no entry strategy.
4 Endogenizing the entrants obligations
So far we have assumed that the entrant, facing an incumbent endowed with
TOP obligations equal to qI , has a long term contract with obligations equal to
D qI , so that total obligations equal total demand. Here we want to show that
if the entrant chooses qE in order to maximize prots, it will actually choose
exactly qE = D  qI . In this section therefore we add an initial stage where the
entrant signs its long term contract deciding the amount of TOP obligations.
We already know that if the entrant chooses TOP obligations equal to the
residual demand, qE = D   qI , in equilibrium its prots can be written as
the consumers at monopoly prices.
We obtain similar results without absolute capacity constraints and without dynamic pric-
ing. In our setting, in fact, the key ingredient is the di¤erent timing in entry and pricing
decisions. In the wp version of the paper we prove that segmentation occurs even when both
rms decide simultaneously to enter in the di¤erent submarkets and then, having observed the
entry choices, set simultaneously a price in each of the submarket where they entered. Sequen-
tial entry in our case simply allows to eliminate the coordination problem that simultaneous
entry otherwise would imply in the choice of submarkets.
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(u   916   w)(D   qI).
Let us rst consider a game where the entrant chooses obligations lower than
the residual demand, i.e. qE < D   qI . Having discussed in detail the pricing
and entry decisions in the benchmark case, we just sketch the analysis, which
remains quite similar. Maintaining the sequential contracting structure, this is
equivalent to considering all the contracting stages d = 1; ::; D in a sequence or
to group them in three submarkets of sizes equal to qI , qE and D  qI   qE . We
can then study the entry and pricing decisions according to the timing of the
benchmark case: in each of the three submarkets, that are opened sequentially,
I decides whether to enter, then E chooses as well and nally the active rms
price simultaneously. The equilibrium analysis of the benchmark model points
to the following conclusions12 :
 in the rst submarket of size qI , only the incumbent enters and sets the
monopoly price;
 in the second submarket, of size qE , the roles are reversed and the entrant
is monopolist in this segment;
 for the residual customers, D   qI   qE , both rms would have marginal
cost equal to w having exhausted their obligations. If they both enter, the
equilibrium is symmetric with a price equal to w +  2 , and the two rms
serve half of the residual demand gaining positive prots 4 (D   qI   qE).
Hence, both rms enter.
The total prots obtained by the entrant are now (u  916  w)qE+  4 (D 
qI   qE) < (u   916   w)(D   qI). Hence, the entrant13 does not gain from
having obligations lower than D   qI .
Second, consider the case qE > D   qI , where total obligations are larger
than total demand. The arguments are quite similar to the benchmark case.
We can analyze the equilibrium distinguishing the two submarkets qI = D1 and
D   qI = D2 as before. From the previous analysis, going through the same
steps, it is easy to see that the equilibrium entry and price decisions are the
same as in Proposition 4, with I entering the rst market, and E the second
one, with sales D2 < qE .
Although E has TOP obligations exceeding residual demandD qI , it prefers
not to enter as long as the incumbent has exhausted its own obligations. In fact,
if E decides to enter the rst market, it would share D1 with the incumbent
and, as a consequence, I would not exhaust its obligations qI in the rst market.
Hence, the incumbent would enter the second market as well, destroying the
monopoly prots that E would gain otherwise. Hence, the entrant would prefer
12To save space we leave a formal proof, which is basically the same as the benchmark
model, to the reader.
13Alternatively, in the spirit of our entry model, we can notice that if D > qI + qE there
is room for a third rm with obligations D   qI   qE to enter and monopolize the residual
demand. The rst entrant then would obtain prots (u  9
16
  w)qE < (u  9
16
  w)(D qI)
if installing qE < D   qI .
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to maintain its residual obligations idle (and therefore does not choose excessive
obligations).
Therefore, the entrant will choose to sign obligations equal to the residual
demand D   qI , as assumed in the benchmark model. We summarize this
discussion in the following Proposition.
Proposition 5: If the entrant chooses its obligations qE at time 0, given
the incumbents obligations qI , and then the game follows as in the benchmark
model, the entrant chooses obligations equal to the residual demand, i.e. qE =
D   qI .
The allocation of demand between the incumbent and the entrant in our
model depends on the amount of TOP obligations held by I when liberalization
starts. The market share of the incumbent after entry therefore can be very
large if qI = D, with a very limited scope for newcomers. In the limit, if I
has TOP obligations equal to market demand, there is no room for entry in the
market as claimed above.
To avoid such an outcome, the liberalization plans in some European coun-
tries, as Italy, Spain and UK, have introduced constraints on the incumbent
market share, as antitrust ceilings or release of import contracts. In the follow-
ing section we consider whether this instrument can help to promote competition
in the retail market.
5 Antitrust ceilings and the persistence of seg-
mentation
In this section we enrich the benchmark model, introducing a further restriction
in line with the gas release decisions of a few countries following liberalization:
we assume that the incumbent cannot supply more than a certain amount of
gas, bqI < qI .
In this regime, I can sell (or it is forced to sell, in some cases) its TOP
obligations exceeding bqI to other operators, i.e. it can resell its long run con-
tracts exceeding the ceiling. Consequently, given qE , the TOP obligations of
the entrant in the benchmark model, its overall obligations when antitrust ceil-
ings are introduced become bqE = qE + (qI  bqI). The main di¤erence relative
to the previous case is that market share ceilings imply an absolute capacity
constraint bqI for the incumbent while TOP obligations introduce only a jump
up in marginal costs but do not prevent the incumbent from producing more
than qI .
We can analyze the sequential entry game assuming that the two markets
are D1 = bqI and D2 = D   D1 = bqE and that they are opened sequentially,
assuming the same timing of entries and pricing decisions of the benchmark
model. Considering second stage price equilibria, if only one rm enters the
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optimal price is pm = u   916 and the rm covers D2 unless it is the in-
cumbent and has residual obligations bqI2 < D2. However, the introduction of
(absolute) capacity constraints instead of (milder) TOP obligations changes the
nature of equilibrium price when both rms enter in the second market. In this
case no price equilibrium in pure strategies exists. However, a mixed strategy
equilibrium with positive prots exists, as the following Lemma establishes.
Lemma 3:When both rms enter in the second market and bqI2 + bqE2  D2,bqI2 > 0 and bqE2 > 0, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. An equilibrium in
mixed strategies I2 ; 
E
2 exists. The expected prots of the entrant in the mixed
strategy equilibrium are positive but lower than the monopoly prots in market
2, i.e. EE2 (
I
2 ; 
E
2 ) 2 (0; (u   916   w)D2).
Proof. See Appendix.
The entry decisions in the second market largely correspond to those of
the benchmark model: E enters if and only if it has still residual obligations,
while I enters if and only if it has not yet reached its ceiling. Moving to the
rst market pricing strategies, for any price pair (pI1; p
E
1 ) the incumbent will be
able to cover its demand, since D1I (p
1
I ; p
1
E)  bqI . Then, as in the benchmark
model, each rm has the incentive to price su¢ ciently high in order to induce
the rival to exhaust its take-or-pay obligations. (and ceiling) and stay out of
the second market, where the former rm will gain monopoly power. These
strategies are mutually incompatible, which leads to mixed strategies equilib-
ria. Consequently, it is easy to check that the same price equilibria and entry
decision already analyzed in the benchmark model still apply, even taking into
account the di¤erent second market price equilibrium analyzed in Lemma 3.
The following Proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 6: In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game with an-
titrust ceilings, the incumbent enters in the rst market D1 while the entrant
enters in the second market D2. Both rms charge to their customer(s) the
monopoly price u   916 .
The only e¤ect of antitrust ceilings is therefore to create scope for entry and
to shift market shares and prots from the incumbent to newcomers. Notice
that forcing the incumbent to sell import contracts or setting a corresponding
ceiling to its nal sales would yield the same result. Customers do not benet
from gas release programs of this type, as the segmentation result and monopoly
pricing still hold.
6 The introduction of a wholesale market
Antitrust ceilings are not able to prevent the segmentation of the market: even
in this setting, the incentive to spend in di¤erent markets the low marginal cost
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capacity due to TOP obligations drives the marketing phase of the game, where
the rms decide which customers to approach. In this section we want to explore
the consequences of separating the wholesale and retail activities, creating a
wholesale gas market, where the wholesalers bearing TOP obligations sell and
the retailers buy their gas at a (linear) wholesale price.
We argue that breaking the link between the decentralised retail market,
where entry decisions in the customerssubmarkets are taken, and the upstream
wholesale segment, where TOP are imposed by producers, may o¤er a solution.
To this end, two reforms of the market are needed. First of all, operators in
the upstream market (wholesalers), that contract and purchase gas from the
extractors, cannot participate also in the dowstream market (retailers), where
rms provide gas to the nal consumers. Secondly, a compulsory wholesale
market is created where wholesalers sell and retailers buy gas at a common
wholesale price. We try to model this alternative environment keeping the
structure of the model as close as possible to the benchmark case.
The wholesale market. On the supply side of the wholesale market,
we have two large operators (our rms I and E). They obtain gas from the
producers on the basis of long term contracts with TOP clauses as described in
the benchmark model, up to output levels qI and qE with qI + qE = D. On the
demand side we have the retail rms, which buy gas from the wholesale market
and resell it to nal consumers. Since gas is a commodity, wholesale transaction
entail perfectly homogenous product by the two wholesalers. The equilibrium
wholesale price pw clears the market.
The retail market. The retailers buy at the wholesale price and therefore
are free from TOP obligations, and each of them has the same constant marginal
cost, equal to the wholesale gas price pw, for any amount of gas demanded. As
in the benchmark model, nal demand can be decomposed into D (groups of)
customers of size equal to 1, and the retailers have to decide which customers to
serve. Each group of customers considers the retailerssupplies as di¤erentiated
according to service or location elements. In order to keep the structure of the
model as similar as possible to the benchmark case, we maintain the assumption
that the retail market is also a duopoly14 , with rm a o¤ering variety xa = 14
and rm b o¤ering variety xb = 34 in each submarket.
To sum up, the nal demand is the same as in the benchmark model, and
the same is true for the wholesale supply of gas and the costs of TOP contracts.
However, once a wholesale market is introduced, we obtain a separation between
the wholesalers I and E bearing TOP obligations and the retailers a an b, that
select the submarkets to serve with a constant marginal cost pw.
Since the retailers in this setting have always the same marginal cost pw,
when analysing their entry and price decisions there is no need to group the
consumers in two subsets D1 and D2 (equal to qI and qE respectively) as we
did in the benchmark model, since in the present setting the entry decisions
in the di¤erent submarkets d = 1; :::; D are all identical. When analyzing the
14The extension to the N retailers case using the circular road version of the Hotelling model
(Salop (1979)) is however straightforward.
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retail market we maintain the key assumption of the benchmark model, that is
the rms decide entry and price at di¤erent stages.
In the benchmark model we also assumed sequential entry in each submar-
ket, with the incumbent moving rst: as we claimed in the discussion, this as-
sumption is not crucial for the results, since an equilibrium with segmentation
arises even when entry is simultaneous. However, in the asymmetric equilibrium
characterized by segmentation the rms had to solve a coordination problem in
selecting the "right" submarkets to serve as monopolists. This problem was
easily addressed by assuming sequential entry and rst mover advantage by
the incumbent. Even in the present setting the entry pattern is the same with
sequential and simultanous entry; moreover, well show that generalized entry
occurs in equilibrium, implying that we have no coordination problem to solve.
Therefore we can assume simultanous entry in each submarket in the rst stage,
followed by the simultanous price stage.
Entering and setting prices allows the two retailers to collect the orders.
The expected demand for rm j = a; b from customer d , Djd, can be derived
according to the same logic of the benchmark model (expressions (4) and (5)).
In particular, if both rms a and b enter in submarket d (of size 1) the demand
for rm j = a; b is:
Djd =
1
2
+
pid   pjd
 
Total demand for retailer j = a; b is therefore Dj(pa; pb) =
PD
d=1D
j
d(p
a
d; p
b
d)
where pa and pb are the vectors of prices set by the two rms in the D sub-
markets. Finally, D(pa; pb) = Da(pa; pb) +Db(pa; pb) is total demand from the
retailers in the wholesale market. The two wholesalers I and E compete in
prices given total demand.
The timing of the game is therefore:
 at t = 1 the retailers j = a; b decide simultanously whether to enter
submarkets d = 1; ::; D (with total demand D); the entry choices become
public information once taken;
 at t = 2 the retailers set simultaneously the price vectors pa and pb and
collect the orders in the submarket where they entered;
 at t = 3 the wholesalers I and E compete in prices in the (wholesale) mar-
ket, given the demand from the retailers D(pa; pb). The retailers purchase
at the equilibrium wholesale price pwand serve the nal customers at the
contracted prices pa and pb.
Let us consider the equilibrium of the game, starting from the third stage,
where the two wholesalers I and E compete in prices, each endowed with TOP
obligations qI and qE , qI +qE = D. Since the wholesale market is a commodity
market, Bertrand competition describes the basic interaction between the two
rms: they simultaneously post their prices, the demand is allocated and each
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rm supplies its notional demand. In case of equal prices, the allocation of
demand is indeterminate and well assume that the two rms decide how to
share total demand among them. The following Proposition establishes the
wholesale price equilibrium.
Proposition 7: Let total wholesale demand be D(pa; pb) = Da(pa; pb) +
Db(pa; pb). When D(pa; pb) = D the equilibrium wholesale prices are pI =
pE = pw = w. When D(pa; pb) < D the equilibrium wholesale prices are pI =
pE = pw 2 [0; w) and if @Di@D(pa;pb)  0 they are increasing in D(pa; pb).
Proof. See Appendix.
The wholesale equilibrium prices described in the Proposition above are
equal to the unit cost of gas w if D(pa; pb) = D (= qI + qE), i.e if the retailers
serve all the consumers, while pw < w if the retail market is rationed, i.e.
D(pa; pb) < D. Moreover, under the reasonable assumption that when rms
set the same price the individual demand is noncreasing in total demand, the
wholesale price is increasing in total sales. Hence, although the wholesalers have
a stepwise marginal cost curve, the equilibrium wholesale price is an increasing
function of total wholesale supply of gas. We can now conclude our analysis
considering the equilibrium in the retail market.
Proposition 8: In the retail market, each rm j = a; b approaches all
groups of customers d = 1; ::D, and sets a price bpjd = pw +  2 . The subgame
perfect equilibrium of the game is therefore characterized by bpI = bpE = w andbpda = bpdb = w +  2 .
Proof. See Appendix.
A wholesale market, determining a at marginal cost curve at pw, eliminates
the strategic links among the entering decisions in the di¤erent submarkets: the
marginal cost is always the same, and it does not depend on the entry and price
strategies in the other submarkets. Then, the entry decisions are determined
by the (positive) contribution to total prots of the additional segment that is
served.15
A wholesale market succeeds to avoid the segmentation of the retail market
and to obtain generalized competition and lower retail margins (prices). The
15Although in our setting proving that there is no incentive to restrict entry (or rationing
demand through pricing) is easy, because the equilibrium mark-up is additive over the relevant
marginal cost, a more general argument can be used if the margin itself depends on the
marginal cost. Suppose that the retail market is such that the mark-up is decreasing in
the marginal cost pw. In this case it may be convenient for the retailers to enter all the
submarkets but 1, so that total demand is D   1 and the marginal cost pw is below w:
in this case the retailers are trading o¤ the prots in the last submarket with the higher
prots in the inframarginal markets, and might nd it convenient to restrict entry. However,
if entry is allowed, as in the spirit of a competitive retail market, a new comer, that has
no inframarginal prots to consider, would enter and serve the last submarket, making the
marginal cost increasing to w:
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wholesale rms, on the other hand, are able to cover their TOP obligations
with no losses. In this setting, the competitive bias deriving from long term
supply contracts and take-or-pay clauses is avoided, because when the retailers
purchase the gas in a liquid wholesale market they have at and symmetric
marginal costs independently of individual output levels. The basic mechanism
of the benchmark model, such that by leaving a submarket to the rival a rm
would secure to be monopolist on the residual demand, does not work anymore:
by entering the additional submarkets a rm would have the same costs as
the rivals and would gain margins over the wholesale price. Hence, generalized
entry and competition replace selective entry and monopoly pricing. Notice that
sequential entry would determine the same result, since there is no strategic link
among submarkets and it is a dominant strategy to enter in each submarket.
It should be stressed that competition in the upstream segment, where the
wholesale suppliers sell to the market, may not necessarily lead to a wholesale
price equal to the unit cost of gas w, according to the Bertrand equilibrium.
The literature on supply function equilibria16 has shown that the Bertrand
equilibrium corresponds to the rms using a supply curve equal to their true
marginal costs; but if rms are able to commit to a supply curve that includes
a mark-up over marginal costs, the equilibrium wholesale prices may be much
higher that the competitive ones. In our case, while the downstream margins
 
2 are low, due to competition and the limited scope for product di¤erentiation,
the wholesale price might be much higher than w if the wholesalers use more
complex strategies, increasing accordingly the price for the nal customers. The
separation of wholesalers and retailers and the creation of a wholesale market,
therefore, ensure to squeeze retail margins, but has no e¤ect on the kind of
competition in the wholesale market. Even in this case, however, the outcome
in the present setting cannot be worse for customers than that of the benchmark
model: if the wholesalers collude they will nd it protable to set a wholesale
price pw such that all the nal customers purchase given the equilibrium retail
prices, i.e. pw +  2 = u
   916 . In this case, we have no improvement with
respect to the case of decentralized markets. Any wholesale price below pw,
however, will increase nal customers surplus by decreasing retail prices. In
this sense, introducing a wholesale market makes customers (weakly) better o¤.
7 Conclusions
We have considered in this paper entry and competition in the liberalized natural
gas market. The model rests on three key assumptions, that correspond to
essential features of the gas industry: wholesale and retail activities are not
separated and are run by the same rms (retailers, that, due to TOP obligations,
are endowed with low marginal cost core capacity, with higher marginal costs
16See Klemperer and Meier (1989) and, on the electricity market, Green and Newbery
(1992).
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for additional supply. The retail market is decentralized and the marketing
decision regarding which customers to serve is medium term and sunk once
taken. Once chosen the submarkets to serve, rms compete in prices, with
slight di¤erentiation in the commercial service that justies the expectation of
a fragmented market structure in the downstream market.
Our main nding is that entry can lead to segmentation and monopoly pric-
ing rather than competition. The key mechanism works as follows: in a decen-
tralized market each rm has to choose which customers to approach; since both
rms have TOP obligations, if both compete for the same customer(s) the equi-
librium price gives very low margins. However, if a rm exhausts its obligations
acting as a monopolist in a segment of the market, it looses any incentive to
further enter in the residual part of the market, because it would be unable to
obtain positive sales and prots competing with a (low cost) rival still burdened
with TOP obligations. Hence, leaving a fraction of the market to the competi-
tor ensures to remain monopolist on the residual demand, maximizing the rents
over the low cost capacity. The equilibrium entry pattern requires to select dif-
ferent submarkets and pricing as a monopolist. The outcome is therefore one of
entry without competition.
This result persists even when antitrust ceilings or forced divestiture of im-
port contracts are imposed to the incumbent, as in some national liberalization
plans in Europe is prescribed: the only e¤ect of these measures it that of shifting
market shares and prots to the entrant, without inducing competition in the
same submarkets. A more complex reform, instead, can have positive e¤ects on
competition. It requires to separate wholesalers, that purchase gas from the pro-
ducers according to long term contract with TOP clauses, from retailers, that
select the submarket to serve and set nal prices, creating a wholesale market
where the former supply and the latter demand gas. In this case the retailers,
when designing their marketing strategy, have a at marginal cost equal to the
wholesale price and their dominant strategy is to enter each and every sub-
market. Then, generalized price competition occurs and the retail margins are
squeezed compared to the benchmark case. The level of the wholesale price (and
competition in the wholesale market) becomes crucial in this perspective. With
intense competition the nal price of gas becomes very low, although we might
imagine more complex strategies of the wholesalers, e.g. competition in supply
functions, that can implement high (wholesale) prices. In any case, customers
are not worse o¤ in a wholesale market setting compared with the benchmark
case.
These results suggest that the liberalization plans, focussed so far on the
task of creating opportunities of entry and a level playing eld for new comers,
should not take as granted that entry will bring in competition in the market.
The issue of promoting competition seems the next step that the liberalization
policies need to address.
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8 Appendix
Proof. of Lemma 1.
Lets consider rst all the possible cases in which the rm(s) set a price
that induce all the consumers in the rst market to purchase. Since qI + qE =
D1 + D2 if only I enters it exhausts its obligations while E still retains all its
obligations: qI2 = 0 and q
E
2 = D2 (case 1). If only E enters the opposite occurs:
qI2 = D1 > D2 and q
E
2 = 0 (case 2). If both enter in the rst market and E sets
a price such that it does not sell more than its obligations, qI2 + q
E
2 = D2 with
qi2 2 [0; D2], i = I; E (case 1). If both enter and E sets a price such that it sells
more than its obligations, I remains with residual obligations larger than the
second market, i.e. qI2 > D2 and q
E
2 = 0 (case 2).
We turn now to all the cases in which the price(s) set by the entrant(s) induce
only a fraction of consumers in the rst market to purchase. If only I enters
it retains some of its initial obligations while E still retains all its obligations:
qI2 + q
E
2 > D2 with q
I
2 > 0 and q
E
2 = D2 (case 2 or 3). If only E enters it can
either exhaust its obligations or retain some of them, according to the price set,
while I retains all its obligations: qI2 = D1 > D2 and q
E
2  0 (case 2 or 3). If
both enter in the rst market and E sets a price such that it does not sell more
than its obligations, qI2 + q
E
2 > D2 with q
I
2 > D2 and q
E
2  0 (case 2 or 3).
If both enter and E sets a price such that it sells more than its obligations, I
remains with residual obligations larger than the second market, i.e. qI2 > D2
and qE2 = 0 (case 2).
Finally, if no rm enters in the rst market, both retain their initial obliga-
tions: qI2 = D1 and q
E
2 = D2 (case 3).
Proof. of Lemma 2.
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Notice at rst that for given pj2 any p
i
2  pi2(pj2; qi2) implies Di2(pi2; pj2)  qi2
and c = w and any pi2 > p
i
2(p
j
2; q
i
2) implies D
i
2(p
i
2; p
j
2) < q
i
2 and c = 0. Now,
suppose that for a given pj2 we haveD
i
2(bpi2(pj2; 0); pj2) < qi2. Then, it must be that
the optimal reply for rm i is BRi2(p
j
2) = bpi2(pj2; 0). We have in fact pi2(pj2; qi2) <bpi2(pj2; 0), the prots are maximized at bpi2(pj2; 0) for any pi2 > pi2(pj2; qi2), they
are increasing (from above) at pi2(p
j
2; q
i
2) and become steeper for lower p
i
2 as the
marginal costs switches from 0 to w. Hence, bpi2(pj2; 0) is the global maximum.
Solving explicitly the condition Di2(bpi2(pj2; 0); pj2) = qi2 in terms of pj2 gives us
the boundary of this region. If  2D2 (4q
i
2  D2) > 0 this region is non-empty.
Suppose now that for a given pj2 we have D
i
2(bpi2(pj2; w); pj2)  qi2;that implies
pi2(p
j
2; q
i
2)  bpi2(pj2; w), the prots are maximized at bpi2(pj2; w) for any pi2 
pi2(p
j
2; q
i
2), they are decreasing and continuous at p
i
2(p
j
2; q
i
2) and decreasing for
higher pi2 when we enter into the region where the marginal costs switches from
w to 0, since bpi2(pj2; 0) < bpi2(pj2; w). Hence, bpi2(pj2; w) is the global maximum.
Solving explicitly the condition Di2(bpi2(pj2; w); pj2) = qi2 in terms of pj2 gives us
the boundary of this region.
For intermediate values of pj2 we haveD
i
2(bpi2(pj2; 0); pj2) > qi2  Di2(bpi2(pj2; w); pj2),
that implies bpi2(pj2; 0) < pi2(pj2; qi2)  bpi2(pj2; w). Hence, at pi2(pj2; qi2) the prots
are kinked, i2(p
i
2; p
j
2; w) is nondecreasing from below and 
i
2(p
i
2; p
j
2; 0) is nonin-
creasing from above, implying that pi2(p
j
2; q
i
2) is a maximum. If
 
2D2
(4qi2 D2) >
0, when pj2 =
 
2D2
(4qi2   D2) we have bpi2(pj2; 0) = pi2(pj2; qi2), i.e. the best re-
ply BRi2(p
j
2) is continuous moving from the rst to the second region. For
pj2 = w +
 
2D2
(4qi2   D2) we have bpi2(pj2; w) = pi2(pj2; qi2) and the best reply
BRi2(p
j
2) is continuous moving from the second to the third region.
Proof. of Proposition 1 .
If both rms enter in the second market, we have price competition with
residuals obligations that fall in one of the three cases analyzed in Lemma
1. The best reply functions in these subgames di¤er for the position of the
intermediate segments
pi2(p
j
2; q
i
2) = p
j
2  
 
2D2
(2qi2  D2)
pj2(p
i
2; q
j
2) = p
i
2  
 
2D2
(2qj2  D2):
In order to identify their relative position we can substitute the second in the
rst:
pi2(p
j
2(p
i
2; q
j
2); q
i
2) = p
i
2  
 
D2
(qi2 + q
j
2  D2):
This expression can be interpreted in the following way: pick a price pi2 and
identify the price of rm j that makes rm js demand equal to its residual
obligations: pj2(p
i
2; q
j
2). Evaluate at p
j
2(p
i
2; q
j
2) the price of rm i that gives a
demand for rm i equal to its residual obligation, i.e. pi2(p
j
2(p
i
2; q
j
2); q
i
2). If this
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price for rm i is smaller than the original price pi2, then p
i
2(p
j
2; q
i
2) lies to the
left of pj2(p
i
2; q
j
2), etc.
If qi2 + q
j
2 = D2 the two segments overlap, i.e. p
i
2(p
j
2(p
i
2; q
j
2); q
i
2) = p
i
2 while
if qi2 + q
j
2 > D2 we have p
i
2(p
j
2(p
i
2; q
j
2); q
i
2) < p
i
2, implying that p
i
2(p
j
2; q
i
2) lies to
the left (above) pj2(p
i
2; q
j
2) in the (p
i
2; p
j
2) space. Let us now consider the three
cases in the statement of the Proposition.
In case 1), qi2 + q
j
2 = D2, the two best reply functions overlap along the
intermediate segments giving a continuum of Nash equilibria. Among them,
we select the Pareto dominant price pair. If qi2  D2=2 the two best reply
functions overlap below or at the locus pi2 = p
j
2 and the higher price pair is
identied - see gure 2 - by the intersection of pj2(p
i
2; q
j
2) and bpi2(pj2; w), i.e.
pi2 = bpi2(pj2 ; w) and pj2 = pj2(pi2 ; qj2) . The solution is given in the statement of
the Proposition. Notice that the two rms sell exactly their residual obligations
and that pi2 > p
j
2 > 0 due to assumption (3).
In case 2) we have qi2 + q
j
2 > D2 and q
i
2  D2=2 < qj2. Hence, pj2(pi2; qj2) <
pi2(p
j
2(p
i
2; q
j
2); q
i
2) < p
i
2, that is, the intermediate segments of both best reply
functions are below the locus pi2 = p
j
2, with p
i
2(p
j
2; q
i
2) above p
j
2(p
i
2; q
j
2). Then,
the two best reply functions intersect - see gure 2 - at pi2 = p
i
2(p
j
2 ; q
i
2) and
pj2 = bpi2(pi2 ; 0): the explicit solutions are in the statement. Notice that at the
equilibrium prices only rm i sells all its capacity (pj2 > p
j
2(p
i
2 ; q
j
2))
In case 3) qi2 + q
j
2 > D2 and q
i
2; q
j
2 > D2=2 we have p
i
2(p
j
2(p
i
2; q
j
2); q
i
2) <
pj2(p
i
2; q
j
2) < p
i
2, that is, the intermediate segment p
i
2(p
j
2; q
i
2) lies above the
locus pi2 = p
j
2 while p
j
2(p
i
2; q
j
2) lies below it. Then, the two best reply functions
intersect - see gure 2 - at pi2 = bpi2(pj2 ; 0) and pj2 = bpj2(pi2 ; 0) and in the
symmetric equilibrium each rm covers half of the market.
In case 4) if only rm i enters market 2, the demand is described above by
(4) or (5). The highest price at which every consumer buys one unit of the good
is pm = u  916 . As long as u  3316 , any price above pm implies a fall in the
monopolists prot. Moreover, we require that pm  w. The two conditions are
met under assumption (2). The prots are maximized at pm for any level of the
marginal cost, and therefore, the equilibrium price if only one rm enters in the
market is pi2 = u
   916 = pm for any possible level of the residual obligations
of the entrant.
Proof. of Proposition 2.
In Lemma 1 we have identied the relevant subgames in the second market,
indexed to the residual obligations qI2 and q
E
2 of the two rms (cases 1-3), while
in Proposition 1 we have characterized the corresponding price equilibria in case
one or both rms enter. If both rms enter, no rm in the relevant subgames sells
more than its residual obligations and obtains positive prots if it has positive
residual obligations. If a rm already exhausted its obligations and enters, it
obtains no sales and prots in the corresponding price equilibrium. Hence,
according to the no frivolous entry assumption, it does not enter. If, instead,
a rm has positive residual obligations, entering is a dominant strategy: if the
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other rm does not enter the entrant realizes the monopoly prots; if it enters
as well, the former rm obtains positive sales and prots.
Proof. of Proposition 3.
Point (a). We consider the incentives to overpricing of the incumbent, that
has a larger TOP obligations. From Proposition 1 we know that rm Is prots
in market 1 are maximized at pm = u   916 . If rm I sets a price pI1 >
pm, DI1(p
I
1) < D1, leaving some residual obligation q
I
2 = D1   DI1(pI1) > 0.
Proposition 2 has shown that in this case both rms will enter also in the second
market. Is overall prots are I = pI1D
I
1(p
I
1)+min

 D22 ; (3   4 qI2=D2)qI2
	
.
Then the derivative of the prot function evaluated at pI1  !+ u   916 is
@I
@pI1
= 1  2
3 
(u   9
16
 )  9D1   12D2
12 D2
< 0
that is, the second market prot gains do not compensate the reduced prots
in the rst market. The same holds true a fortiori if only rm E enters in the
rst market.
Point (b). Let us dene the following subsets of the strategy space P =
(pI1; p
E
1 ) 2 [0; u]2
	
:
PA =
n
(pI1; p
E
1 )
pI1 2 [0; u]; pE1 2 [0;minnpI1 +  eD;uo]o (10)
PB =

(pI1; p
E
1 )
pI1 2 [0; u    eD]; pE1 2 (pI1 +  eD;minpI1 +  2 ; u

)

PC =

(pI1; p
E
1 )
pI1 2 [0; u    2 ]; pE1 2 [pI1 +  2 ; u]

where eD = (D1   2D2)=2D1. When (pI1; pE1 ) 2 PA rm E exhausts its oblig-
ations in the the rst market (DE1 (p
I
1; p
E
1 )  D2 = qE) and does not enter in
the second. Conversely, when (pI1; p
E
1 ) 2 PC rm E doesnt sell anything in the
rst market and I exhausts its capacity; therefore in the second market only E
will enter. Finally, for (pI1; p
E
1 ) 2 PB no rm exhausts its obligations in the rst
market and therefore both will enter also in the second. Hence, the three sets
dene di¤erent entry patterns in the second stage. Notice, for future reference,
that PA and PC are closed sets while PB is open. From the previous discus-
sion, the incumbents prots jump up at the boundary of PA while the entrants
prots have a similar pattern at the boundary of PC since in the two cases one
of the rms remains monopolist in the second market. Finally, the industry
prots  = I +E are discontinuous at the boundaries of PA and PC , since
the joint prots when the second market is a duopoly (region PB) are strictly
lower than those obtained when it becomes a monopoly. Once introduced this
notation we can prove part (b) distinguishing the three points.
Point 1. We prove that no price equilibrium in pure strategies exists if
both rms enter in the rst market. The incumbents prot function in the rst
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market is I1 = D
I
1(p
I
1; p
E
1 )p
I
1. If (p
I
1; p
E
1 ) 2 PC , it corresponds to the overall
prots I since the incumbent does not enter in the second market; at the
boundary of PB with PC (where the two rms enter in the second market) the
residual capacity of the incumbent qI2, and the second market prots, tend to
zero. Hence, I is continuous moving from PC to PB . At the boundary of
PB and PA the entrant exhausts all its obligations in market 1, and I becomes
monopolist in market 2, adding (u  916 )D2 to the rst market prots. Hence,
since I produces in the rst market in all the three regions I has a global
maximum at the boundary of PA where the market 2 monopoly prots are
added, and the incumbent best reply is pI1 = p
E
1   eD. Turning to the entrants
prots, a similar pattern occurs, with a discrete jump in the prot function
entering region PC , where E = (u   916 )D2. The entrants prots has a
global maximum at the boundary of PC and its best reply is pE1 = p
I
1+
 
2 . Hence,
there is no price pair that satises the two best reply functions simultaneously.
Each rm wants the rival to sell all its obligations in the rst market, in order
to monopolize the second market. This proves point 1.
Point 2. Now we turn to proving the existence of a mixed strategy equi-
librium in prices, relying on Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) Theorem 5. First
notice that rm is strategy space P i  R+ and the discontinuity set for the
incumbent is (using Dasgupta and Maskin notation)
P (I) =
n
(pI1; p
E
1 )
pI1 2 [0; u    eD]; pE1 = pI1 +  eDo ;
i.e. the boundary of PC . Analogously, the discontinuity set for the entrant is
P (E) =

(pI1; p
E
1 )
pI1 2 [0; u    2 ]; pE1 = pI1 +  2

;
i.e. the boundary of PA. Hence, the discontinuities occur when the two prices
are linked by a one-to-one relation, as required (see equation (2) in Dasgupta and
Maskin (1986)), while i(pI1; p
E
1 ) is continuous elsewhere. Second,  = 
I+E
is upper semi-continuous (see Denition 2 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986)):
since I , E and  are continuous within the three subsets PA, PB and PC ,
for any sequence fpng  P j and p 2 P j , j = A;B;C, such that pn  ! p,
limn !1(pn) = (p). In other words, at any sequence that is completely
internal to one of the three subsets P j the joint prots are continuous. If
instead we consider a sequence fpng converging to the discontinuity sets from
the open set PB , i.e.fpng  PB and p 2 P (i), i = I; E, such that pn  ! p,
then limn !1(pn) < (p), i.e. the joint prots jump up. Third, i(pI1; p
E
1 ) is
weakly lower semi-continuous in pi1 according to Denition 6 in Dasgupta and
Maskin (1986). At (pI1; p
E
1 ) 2 P (I), if we take (see Dasgupta and Maskin
(1986)  = 0, limpI1 !+pI1 
I(pI1; p
E
1 ) = 
I
I(p
1
I ; p
1
E). Analogously, at (p
1
I ; p
1
E) 2
P (E), if we take  = 1, limpE1  ! pE1 
E(pI1; p
E
1 ) > 
E(p1I ; p
1
E). Then all the
conditions required in Theorem 5 are satised and a mixed strategy equilibrium
(I1 ; 
E
1 ) exists.
Point 3. Finally, we prove that EI(I1 ; 
E
1 ) > 0 and E
E(I1 ; 
E
1 ) <
(u  916 )D2. The rst inequality simply follows from the fact that i(pi1; pj1) >
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0 for any p 2 P . To establish the second inequality, notice that maxp2P
E(pI1; p
E
1 ) = (u
   916 )D2, occurring when p 2 PC . Let the support of
the mixed strategy i1 be M
i. Suppose that the mixed strategies I1 ; 
E
1 are
such that in the mixed strategy equilibrium p 2 PC occurs with probability
1: since I1 and 
E
1 are independent, it means that M
I  [0; (u    2 )=2]
and ME  [(u +  2 )=2; u]. But then the incumbent can protably deviate
from I1 while E plays 
E
1 by setting a price p
I
1 =2 M I su¢ ciently high to
be in PA with positive probability, a contradiction. Hence, in a mixed strategy
equilibrium it cannot be that PC (and, for the same argument, PA) occur with
probability 1. Then, EE(I1 ; 
E
1 ) < (u
   916 )D2.
Proof. of Proposition 4.
Consider, for di¤erent entry choices in the rst market, the prots of the
two rms evaluated at the equilibrium price in the rst stage and at the entry
and price equilibrium in the second stage:
 eI1 = 1; eE1 = 1: we have seen that in the mixed strategy equilibrium
the two rms obtain expected gross prots EI > 0 and 0 < EE <
(u   916 )D2.
 eI1 = 1; eE1 = 0: the rst market equilibrium price implies that the in-
cumbent uses all its obligations and stays out of the second market. The
prots are therefore I = (u  916  w)D1 and E = (u  916  w)D2.
 eI1 = 0; eE1 = 1: in this case it is the entrant that covers all the rst market
demand at the monopoly price staying out at the second stage. We have
therefore I = (u   916 )D2   wD1 and E = (u   916   w)D1.
 eI1 = 0; eE1 = 0: if no rm enters in the rst market, both will enter in the
second with prots I =  D24   wD1 and E =  D24   wD2.
 Since the incumbent moves rst, and makes positive prots entering the
rst market for any reaction of the entrant, I enters. Since EE <
(u   916 )D2 the entrant is better o¤ staying out of the rst market and
becoming a monopolist in the second market. Uniqueness simply follows
by construction.
Proof. of Lemma 3.
We start by considering the best reply funcions in the price game of the
second market when bqI2 + bqE2 = D2, keeping in mind that, contrary to the
benchmark case, the incumbent cannot sell more than its ceiling bqI2 . Its prot
function in the second market is I2 = p
I
2min(D
I
2(p
I
2; p
E
2 ),bqI2). Let us introduce
the following notation:
epI2(bqI2) = u    max 116 ; (14   bqI2)2

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that is the maximum price that induces all the bqI2 consumers to buy from I
rather than nothing. The best reply for the incumbent is therefore
BRI2(p
E
2 ) =
8<: bp
I
2(p
E
2 ; 0) for p
E
2 2
h
0;max
n
0;  2D2 (4bqI2  D2)oi
min

pI2(p
E
2 ; bqI2); epI2(bqI2)	 for pE2 2 hmaxn0;  2D2 (4bqI2  D2)o ; ui
where pI2(p
E
2 ; bqI2) is such that DI2(pI2(pE2 ; bqI2); pE2 ) = bqI2 . Hence, when pE2 is very
low the incumbent maximizes its prots selling less than its ceiling while for
higher prices of the entrant I sets the price that induces all the bqI2 consumers to
buy from it: notice that for very high prices of the entrant the best alternative
to Ifor those consumers is to buy nothing rather than purchasing from E.
The entrants prots are E2 = (p
E
2   cE)(D2   min(DI2(pI2; pE2 ),bqI2)) with
cE = f0; wg. Since the incumbent cannot sell more than bqI2 , the entrant has an
incentive to set the highest price that induces all the D2  bqI2 consumers to buy
from it rather than nothing:
epE2 (bqI2) = u    max 116 ; (34   bqI2)2

This price is the best reply for prices of the incumbent that are not extremely
high. To check whether epE2 (bqI2) is always the entrant best reply, let us consider
@E2
 epI2(bqI2); epE2 (bqI2); w
@pE2
= w u+ 

1
2
 max

1
16
; (
1
4
  bqI2)2+ 2max 116 ; (34   bqI2)2

It is easy to check that for any value of bqI2 2 (0; D2] this derivative is negative
given Assumption (2). Hence, while for relatively low values of pI2 the entrant
has an incentive to set the highest price epE2 (bqI2) that allows it to serve the residual
market D2   bqI2 , when pI2 approaches its maximum level epI2(bqI2) the entrant is
better o¤by reducing its price and serving (at a marginal cost w) a fraction of the
market larger than its residual obligations, i.e.D2E(p
2
I ; p
2
E) > D2  bqI2 . Hence, no
price equilibrium in pure strategies exists when bqI2+bqE2 = D2. The case bqI2+bqE2 >
D2 is basically the same, the only di¤erence being the marginal cost of the
entrant equal to 0 when computing the derivative @E2 =@p
E
2 at epI2(bqI2); epE2 (bqI2).
It is evident that even in this case the derivative is negative.
From the discussion above it is clear that the entrants prot function (not
surprisingly) is not quasi-concave in its price when the incumbent has antitrust
ceilings (capacity constraints). However, it is continuous and the strategy space
pi2 2 [0; u] is compact and convex. Hence, we can apply Glicksberg (1952)
Theorem establishing that a mixed strategy equilibrium (I2 ; 
E
2 ) exists.
Finally, EE2 (
I
2 ; 
E
2 ) = 0 would occur only if in the mixed strategy
equilibrium pE2 = 0 with probability 1, since any other price pair below epE2 (bqI2)
would leave at least D2 bqI2 sales and positive prots to the entrant. But then E
might deviate from the mixed strategy setting a higher price with certainty and
gaining positive prots. Secondly, Ei2(
I
2 ; 
E
2 ) = (u
   916   w)D2 would
be the case only if the support of the incumbent mixed strategy would include
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only prices so high that I does not sell anything when the entrant is pricing at
pE2 = u
   916 . But this cannot occur in a mixed strategy equilibrium since
the incumbent would be better o¤ by setting with probability one a lower price,
selling its residual ceilings and making prots.
Proof. of Proposition 7.
First notice that wholesale demand is D(pa; pb)  D. The wholesalers are
not capacity constrained, as they can purchase from the extractors at unit cost
w any quantity exceeding their obligations qi. Hence, setting a price above the
rival leaves with no sales and no prots, and it is never an optimal reply as long
as the rival is pricing above w. Considering the price pairs not higher than w,
if rm i sets the same price as the rival, i.e. pi = pj , i; j = I; E; i 6= j, its prots
are i = pjDi, where Di are rm i sales: if D(pa; pb) = qI + qE , then Di = qi
while if D(pa; pb) < qI + qE , then Di  qi, with strict inequality for at least
one rm. If rm i undercuts rm j, setting pi = pj   ", taking the limit for
" ! 0 the prots are i = pjD(pa; pb)   w(D(pa; pb)   qi), i.e. rm i supplies
the entire demand and purchases additional gas D(pa; pb)  qi at unit price w.
Then, comparing the two prots (and remiding that for pj > w it is always
optimal to undercut) we can identify the condition that makes undercutting
protable:
pj > w
D(pa; pb)  qi
D(pa; pb) Di  p
j
Hence, rm i will undercut rm j if pj > pj and rm j will undercut rm
i if pi > pi. Since overpricing is never protable, the equilibrium prices will
be pi = pj = min

pi; pj
	
. Notice that pi and pj depend on the allocation of
demand between the two rms, Di and Dj . If D(pa; pb) = qI+qE , then Di = qi
and min

pi; pj
	
= w. If instead D(pa; pb) < qI + qE , min

pi; pj
	
< w. Since
min

pi; pj
	
depends on the rule the rms follow in allocating total demand
when they set the same price, i.e. on the way Di and Dj are determined, we
have no explicit solution without choosing a precise rule. However, assuming
that @D
i
@D(pa;pb)
 0, i.e. that if total demand falls individual demand cannot
increase when rms set the same price, we obtain
@pi
@D(pa; pb)
= w
qi  Di + @Di
@D(pa;pb)
(min

pi; pj
	  qi)
(min

pi; pj
	 Di)2 > 0
Hence, even without choosing an explicit allocation rule we are able to show that
under reasonable conditions the equilibrium wholesale price pw is increasing in
total demand and sales D(pa; pb).
Proof. of Proposition 8.
Let us rst consider the retail market equilibrium prices. The marginal costs
of the two rms is pw = w if total demand for gas D(pa; pb) is equal to D and
pw < w if total demand for gas is lower than D. If both rms enter in submarket
d, rm is prots, i; j = a; b, i 6= j, are
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id =
"
1
2
+
pjd   pid
 
#  
pd   pw

If we consider submarket d in isolation, the unique simmetric equilibrium
in prices is pid = p
j
d = pw +
 
2 , with the two rms covering half of demand
Dd = 1. The prots in this submarket are id =
 
4 , independently of the level
of the marginal cost pw. Since the marginal cost of the two rms is at for
any level of output and the prots add-up a margin  2 over (any) marginal cost
pw, there is no strategic link among submarket and with total demand in the
wholesale market, and this pricing strategy is the symmetric equilibrium in all
submarkets where the two rms enter. Turning to the entry decisions, no matter
how large is total demand for gas (and therefore the wholesale price and the
marginal cost pw), the entry in each submarket increases overall prots by a
positive amount (  4 if also the other rm enters and u
   916   pw if the rival
stays out).
Since entering in each submarket is the dominant strategy for each rm,
both rms will enter in all submarkets and will set a price such that all the
submarket demand is covered. Total demand equals D and the wholesale price
(marginal cost) is w.
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Figure 1: Best Reply: BRI(pE)
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Prices: A-B (case 1)
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Price: A (case 2)
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Price: A (case 3)
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